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African-American Farmers 
and Fair Lending: Racializing 
Rural Economic Space 
by 
Cassandra Jones Havard 
"[T]he rules and the law may be 
color-blind, [but] people are not." 
-J. L. Chestnut, Plaintiffs' Attorney 
Pigford v. Glickman.2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The relationship of the 
federal government to the 
economic development of the 
minority-owned farm as a business 
raises issues of political authority.3 
The United States Department of 
Agriculture'S (USDA) loan 
qualification scheme allows locally 
In the context of 




ultimately flawed as 
applied. 
power in the USDA loan scheme 
between the federal government and 
local citizens is unique and uneven. 
The USDA process--calling for the 
election of local representatives 
among the population of farmers 
within a particular county-gives 
elected farmers both critical 
discretion regarding loan eligibility 
and an opportunity for self-
aggrandizement. Racial minority 
farmers' lack of access to credit-the 
by-product of this long-standing 
elected farmers-who, with few exceptions, are white-to 
make substantive decisions regarding an applicant 
farmer's creditworthiness. For many African-American 
farmers, this structure has resulted in a sustained lack of 
access to USDA's low-cost funds and, eventually, to land 
10ss.4 
The congressional decision that local farmers are 
able to make the best determinations concerning borrower 
eligibility for federal agricultural loan funds leads to 
concerns as to whether Congress' federalism objective of 
delegation of authority to local constituents can ever be 
met. As an issue of political authority, the balance of 
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federal scheme-provides fertile 
ground for challenging the devolution of authority to local 
landowners. In the context of small farm policy, two core 
democratic principles, federalism and neutrality, are 
ultimately flawed as applied. The ideal of federalism-
that state and local governments can share power with the 
federal government-is lost when programs are not 
monitored for compliance with stated goals and 
objectives. The presumed neutrality of the USDA's 
process for disbursing federal funds raises questions about 
the congressional purpose given a result that is, at best, 
described as the deleterious sacrifice of land owned by 
minority small farmers.s Negative biases that should not 
color a neutral governmental process have been given the 
aura of federal approval. 
This article focuses on how to measure loss when 
racial discrimination dominates economic policies and 
results in identifiable economic injustice.6 More 
importantly, it draws a nexus between credit availability 
and intergenerational property transmission.7 This article 
concludes that the loss of African-American owned 
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farmland due to discriminatory credit decisions decreases 
opportunities for inheritance of real property. The 
proposed changes in federal law set forth in this article 
can help to remedy the cumulative effects of USDA's 
financing inequities. 
Part I of this paper presents an overview of USDA's 
role as a financial intermediary. It identifies the goals of 
the federal agricultural lending program and explains the 
authority and policy choices given to locally elected 
farmers. It illustrates the direct competition between 
friends and neighbors for low-cost loan funds and 
summarizes the recent class action settlement of claims 
between African-American farmers and USDA. Part II 
describes USDA's approach as one with federalist and 
economic underpinnings. It identifies the arguments 
supporting devolution of power from the federal 
government to local jurisdictions. It also examines the 
competing theories of information costs, transaction costs, 
and agency costs as they relate to USDA as a financial 
intermediary. Finally, it critiques both the federalism and 
economic justifications of USDA's decision to allow local 
farmers to make credit decisions. Challenging the fairness 
to minority constituent concerns of locally controlled 
political processes, the article suggests that local 
constituencies that do not mandate accountability for 
minority interests may unfairly influence the supposedly 
democratic majoritarian regime. Given the absence of 
monitoring for compliance within the federal programs, 
there is inadequate justification for the role of the county 
committee in the lending process. 
Part III discusses fair credit law and concludes that 
the applicable statute, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act 
(ECOA) is an inadequate remedy when credit 
discrimination affects small businesses. That section 
proposes an alternative way to measure the harm and to 
correct the authority and operational imbalances. It 
recommends a change in the make-up of the county 
committee by allowing locally qualified citizens, who are 
not farmers, to make the credit decisions. Next, it argues 
for more stringent monitoring, record keeping and 
reporting requirements in order to determine promptly 
whether discriminatory lending patterns exist. Finally, the 
article recommends an alternative way to measure actual 
loss by allowing compensation for loss of prospective 
inheritance. 
II. USDA AS LENDER 
As a financial intermediary, USDA's credit-granting 
procedures are atypical. First, in contrast to a traditional 
lender, there is a lack of neutrality in the lending process. 
The local farmers charged with determining eligible 
borrowers are themselves eligible for the same USDA 
loan funds. Second, unlike a traditional lender, the denial 
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of a USDA loan request entitles the applicant to an 
administrative review of that decision. The administrative 
review process becomes a proxy for the inherent conflict 
of interest in the loan eligibility scheme. For African-
American farmers, the lack of neutrality in the decision-
making process and the suspension of the administrative 
process used to challenge denials combines to create a 
political system that limits their economic rights. 
A. IN THEORY: THE LOAN DETERMINATION AND 
REvmw PROCESS 
The 1935 Soil Conservation and Domestic 
Allotment Act8 governs USDA's current financial 
assistance and loan distribution scheme. The primary 
objectives of the statute are to facilitate and provide 
agricultural credit to the country's farmers. As discussed 
below, that credit is distributed largely through a 
decentralized process of local- and state-elected farmers 
whose job is to promote USDA's policies and programs. 
Through the Farm Service Agency (FSA), USDA is the 
key intervener in the farm economy, providing price and 
income support and loans at a below-market rate to the 
country's farmers.9 
USDA lends both directly and indirectly.1O The 
direct loan program awards insured loans to borrowers 
who have been denied credit elsewhere. I I Eligible 
borrowers are those who have training or experience in 
farming, operate a family farm, and are unable to obtain 
credit elsewhere at reasonable rates and terms.12 The 
indirect lending program uses similar criteria but issues 
guarantees to non-government lenders who make farm 
ownership and operating loans.13 
Small farmers favor USDA loans for several reasons. 
First, most small farmers tend to be unable to obtain credit 
from commercial institutions.14 Second, the interest rates 
on USDA loans are generally lower than rates from 
commercial lenders. Finally, USDA has a special interest 
rate for "low-income, limited-resource" borrowers, and 
subsidized interest rates are available for guaranteed 
loans. Limited resource borrowers are low-income 
farmers who do not qualify even under normal USDA 
loan programs and who need to maximize their incomes 
from farming. IS 
USDA uses the county committee system to 
determine who will participate in its direct lending and 
benefit programs. All farmers residing in a county elect 
three to five local farmers to a committee that USDA 
authorizes to make these determinations.16 The members 
of the county committee in tum elect a county executive 
who has the responsibility to assist farmers in applying for 
and reCeIVIng program funds and who makes 
recommendations to the committee on who should receive 
those funds. USDA pays both the county committee 
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members and the county executive for their services, 
although neither are federal government employees.17 
The loan process is seemingly straightforward: the 
County Executive Director must assist the farmer in 
completing his application; the County Executive Director 
also does an initial review of the application. If the 
county committee approves the application, the farmer 
receives the subsidy or loan. If the application is denied, 
the farmer may appeal to a state committee and then to a 
federal review board. 18 Because USDA borrowers are 
unable to get loans from other lenders, the proper 
implementation of these programs and appeal of 
determinations is crucial.19 As a federal government 
program, USDA has established procedures for review of 
loan denials when applicants' requests are rejected. In 
1980, however, USDA dismantled its Civil Rights 
Division. Consequently, the complaints and appeals of 
black farmers whose loans were denied were never 
processed, investigated or forwarded to the appropriate 
agency. Most African-American farmers who used the 
USDA appeals process never received a response. USDA 
admits that its staff discarded some discrimination 
complaints without ever responding to or investigating 
them,20 while others received a finding of discrimination, 
but no relief.21 The lack of response by USDA to claims 
of racial discrimination in the loan eligibility process led 
to a national class-action lawsuit and the on-going 
settlement of claims by African-American farmers. We 
turn to a discussion of this case now. 
B. IN PRACTICE: THE CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT 
OF CLAIMS 
A national class action suit involving minority 
borrowers challenged USDA's dismantling of its civil 
rights investigation division as discriminatory. USDA 
responded to the lawsuit by announcing that there would 
be no foreclosures where the farmer had a pending 
discrimination claim.22 
The Pigford v. Glickman class action suit arose after 
the plaintiffs, four hundred and one African-American 
farmers, alleged that USDA willfully discriminated 
against them when they applied for farm operating, 
ownership, disaster, and emergency 10ans.23 When a 
farmer's loan application was denied on the basis of race 
or some other discriminatory basis, the farmers were to 
file an administrative claim with the Equal Opportunity 
Office and also with the USDA Secretary or the Office of 
Civil Rights Enforcement and Adjudication (OCREA)?4 
Minority farmers allege that with the dissolution of 
OCREA in 1983, the complaints filed failed to be 
processed, investigated, filed, or forwarded. At best, 
farmers received a cursory denial to the claim, but most 
received no response whatsoever. Some farmers alleged 
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that their claims were not investigated because they were 
lost, destroyed, or thrown away. The Office of Inspector 
General of USDA determined that minority farmers lost 
land and farm income due to the agency's discriminatory 
practices. In addition, the Office of the Inspector General 
stated that the agency failed to act in good faith, that the 
process for resolving complaints failed or was too 
delayed, and that many favorable decisions were 
reversed.25 
The Pigford v. Glickman class certification was 
eventually granted for all African-American farmers who: 
(1) farmed, or attempted to farm between January 1, 1981 
and December 31, 1996; (2) applied for participation in a 
federal farm credit or benefit program with USDA during 
that time and who believed that they were discriminated 
against on the basis of race in USDA's response to the 
application; and (3) filed a discrimination complaint on or 
before July 1, 1997?6 
After almost two years of litigation, a consent decree 
was issued?7 First, all class participants waived their right 
to appeal the decision of the adjudicator as well as to seek 
further review of these matters before any court or 
tribunal?8 Second, the consent decree divided parties 
eligible for compensation into two different classes based 
on the amount of evidence the claimant possesses, Track 
A and Track B, to prove that the discriminatory action 
occurred. 25,105 claims were filed under the consent 
decree as of March 14, 2001, with 21,285 (or 99.4%) 
accepted under Track A, and 196 or .06% of the claims 
accepted for processing under Track B. However, 3,636 
claims were rejected for processing as not being class 
members.29 
Under Track A, claimants must meet the class 
definition and provide substantial evidence of credit 
discrimination to the adjudicator. The claim, which may 
provide direct or indirect proof of discrimination, is 
submitted in a written form describing the discriminatory 
conduct. USDA has the right to respond to every claim, 
with the adjudicator's decision being final. Of the 21,285 
claims accepted for processing in Track A, 8,025 (39.6%) 
rulings were decided against the claimant and 12,253 
(60.4%) rulings were decided in favor of the claimant.30 
Under Track B, claimants that have better evidence 
of discriminatory action by USDA (i.e., documents and 
witnesses) may elect to have a hearing before an arbitrator 
to present evidence that discrimination occurred.31 USDA 
also has an opportunity to present evidence in its favor. 
Track B claimants must meet a higher standard of proof-
a preponderance of the evidence. They present their 
individual circumstances seeking actual damages and 
forgiveness of outstanding USDA loans affected by the 
discriminatory- conduct.32 As of January 17, 2001, the 
arbitrator had issued five rulings-three in favor and two 
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against-out of the 198 claims accepted for processing. 
In addition, seven cases had been dismissed including two 
of which had been settled.33 While the settlement of 
claims will provide a measure of monetary compensation 
for aggrieved farmers, the court's decree neither provides 
for nor critically examines how a supposedly neutral 
process became one of racial subordination and 
domination. 
III. THE COMPOSITE OF FARM LENDING 
POLICY: THE DEVOLUTION OF POWER 
FROM USDA TO LOCAL FARMERS 
Federalism in the United States offers a unique 
scheme of power sharing between the federal and state 
governments. As part of this system of federalism, the 
federal and state governments delegate their power to a 
diverse range of institutions that design and implement 
federal and state policies. 
The devolution of design and implementation 
authority, especially within the federal sphere, critically 
affects the development and viability of economic markets 
at local levels-at those levels where local officials have 
significant implementation authority and/or influence, 
there is legitimate concern over federal policy being 
unduly slanted by the mores, traditions, and political 
realities of the local communities.34 Knowing that judicial 
scrutiny of legislation intensifies where "prejudice against 
discrete and insular minorities . . . tends seriously to 
curtail the operation of those political processes ... relied 
upon to protect minorities,,,35 it is legitimate to inquire as 
to whether a local community's prejudices curtail fair 
operation of federal policies so as to deprive the 
community'S "insular minorities" of benefits that 
otherwise would be theirs. 
Using the plight of small minority-owned farms 
under the 1934 Soil and Conservation Act as the basis for 
our discussion, this section reviews the intersection of 
political power and economic markets in the context of 
the small, minority-owned farm. It concludes that, while 
political decentralization has a capacity for providing an 
adequate and fair process, when that process is flawed 
sectors of the affected economic markets can be and often 
are damaged. 
A. POLITICAL POWER: COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM 
AND CIVIC REpUBLICANISM 
One of the underlying premises of the 1934 Soil and 
Conservation Act is that locally elected agents are more 
appropriate decision-makers than federal government 
bureaucrats when handling agricultural financing issues. 
New Deal era reforms36 delegated power to the states to 
implement federal programs. 37 This restructuring allows 
states to exercise discretion in federal allocations, limiting 
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the federal government's role to creating national 
standards and disbursing funds. 38 
Under a devolved power regime, the local or state 
authority is free from the rigidity of a federal system that 
may be unresponsive to the specific needs of its local 
constituents?9 Such a regime has the decided advantage 
of allowing quick response when change is either 
proposed or imminent. States invariably argue for 
freedom to determine what solutions are best suited 
without the overlay of federal discretion. When federal 
program goals are broad, states can attain the program 
goals within federal guidelines, but without explicit 
federal direction. 
Secondly, in theory, decentralization protects 
democratic principles. The notion is that representational 
governance allows for a truer determination of public 
choice. Civic republicanism, by encouraging citizen 
participation, seeks to join together the common interests 
of citizens. The theory suggests that the guarantees of 
liberty and the protection of property are best guarded by 
local citizens, who have the most to lose if these 
principles erode. Citizens who participate in non-federal 
governance expect that they will have the ability to 
express their choices free from federal interference.40 
Because the power of the government is made direct, 
accessible and less impersonal, citizens gain access that 
may be denied when they have to negotiate the 
bureaucratic maze of federal government. 
Finally, when state and local governments are given 
discretion in allocating federal funds, they allow citizens 
bound by geography the opportunity to participate in the 
democratic process.41 It is important to note that this 
construct presupposes that those citizens who choose to 
participate in the democratic process represent all factions 
of their diverse communities and not simply their own 
narrow interests. When this notion fails, the federal 
government's policy is at risk of not meeting its objectives 
and goals; consequently, as one scholarly argument posits, 
federalism becomes a concept which espouses a 
theoretical increase in citizen participation but does not 
necessarily lead to an actual increase in such 
.. • 42 partICIpatIOn. 
1. Flawed Representational Democracy and Critical 
Race Theory 
A solid justification for local control and decision-
making requires a mechanism for accountability of 
minority interests.43 Although representational democracy 
presumes participating citizens will use the democratic 
process to fairly represent the best interests of fellow 
citizens, opponents of localism argue that the minority can 
become "voiceless" if elected citizens are swayed to 
partial considerations. The concern that local prejudices 
STANFORD LAW & POLICY REVIEW 
may go unchecked by outside force underscores the need 
for a political process that recognizes competitive forces 
exist at the local level that can undermine guarantees of 
liberty and protection of property. Weaknesses in 
representational democracy are apparent when 
constituents become increasingly disenfranchised and 
silenced.44 
In the case of small minority-owned farms, 
representational democracy as evidenced in the race-
neutral process of the County Committee system has 
contributed significantly to the loss of African-American 
owned farmland. In this instance, I posit that critical race 
theory provides a basis for understanding how flawed 
representational democracy presents an example of 
political space and its consequences.4S In other words, 
critical race theory provides a basis for examining the 
construction of race as a neutral, accepted dominant 
norm.46 While there is a tendency to view what is really a 
failed attempt at power sharing between the federal and 
local government as successful cooperative federalism, I 
argue instead that the geographical space (the county) 
defines the political space (who becomes representatives 
or members of the county committee). The all-white 
composition of those committees turned the race-neutral 
process of determining loan eligibility into one of 
domination and subordination. 
2. Defillillg Space 
In current legal discourse, the term "space" denotes 
geographical communities of people with similar 
characteristics.47 Often these geographical areas have 
become racialized 48 because of the groups of people that 
live within them. In many contexts, race and place have 
converged to represent a certain geographic pathos-
places where low-income and/or marginalized people live 
and work.49 As one noted scholar has written, "[a]n 
analysis of racialized space is complex for many reasons, 
as it involves at least the consideration of politics and 
public policy, racially signified and symbolized conflicts, 
and aspects of hegemony, such as the construction of our 
'common sense' understandings of everyday life."so 
The notion of geographic space raises questions 
about the allocation of power within communities and 
how that power is used to determine the community's 
cultural and social practices.S1 The basic inquiry focuses 
on whether conditions within geographic spaces have 
simply evolved due to private choices of individuals or 
whether they have been perpetuated through public laws 
and policy.s2 The evolution of almost exclusively white 
ownership of farmland suggests it is important to look at 
how the considerations of politics and public policy 
converged to define farmland ownership as simply a 
consequence of rational economic considerations. The 
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circumstantial change in farmland ownership was not 
incidental, but developed because of the social and 
political forces that transformed the otherwise neutral 
USDA structure into a system that adversely affected 
African-American farmers. 
3. The COUllty Committee Structure as Political 
SpaceS3 
As a model of federalism, the county committee is 
made up of community representatives making decisions 
about the use of farmland in the communities in which 
they farm. They lose their individual identifications and 
become representatives or agents of USDA charged with 
making neutral, ideally self-effacing decisions about 
credit. County committee members are not asked to 
consider, nor do they seem concerned about, the impact of 
those decisions on minority farmers. They are instead 
allowed to make credit decisions in a vacuum, not 
assessing the impact on minority land ownership nor their 
own inherent self-interestedness.s4 Yet, the historical 
functioning of the county committee raises issues about 
how that structure has politically defined the ownership of 
property for African-American farmers. 
One of the justifications for USDA's county 
committee structure is that it represents a balanced sharing 
of power. This line of reasoning argues for decentralized 
government because it provides the average citizen with 
an opportunity to participate in democratic functions. 
Such a theory posits that the county committee structure 
represents an appropriate mixture of local autonomy and 
control. As a political institution, the county committee 
structure emphasizes the values of citizen participation, 
market responsiveness, and managerial efficiency.ss The 
optimal political structure involving local citizens, 
however, involves these citizens without creating group 
boundaries.s6 While USDA may argue that the county 
committee structure is a microcosm of democracy, an 
appropriate balance of federal and local control must be 
present to guard against the exercise of unfettered 
discretion by non-federal governing units. Any exercise 
of governmental power must be done in a way that is not 
captive to a biased dynamic. 
Given the theory of civic republicanism, it is 
physical geography and the coincidence of residence that 
determine the boundaries of the county committee. Since 
its representatives are drawn from local counties and 
elected from local property owners, it is assumed that they 
are representative of the community at large. This 
creation of a democratic unit based on pre-existing 
geographical boundaries presumes similarities among 
citizens that may not in fact exist. Thus, as one scholar 
has argued, geography may haphazardly create a structure 
that is impenetrable by legal doctrine.s7 In this instance, 
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geography legitimizes the creation of a political unit that 
may not in fact be representational. 
One of the effects of the county committee structure 
is that the county committee uses its decision-making 
power to create white space. Using facially neutral 
policies and procedures, the county committee structure 
allows the competition for scarce resources-USDA's 
yearly allocation of farm loans and subsidies-to 
determine the committee's operation as a governance 
mechanism. By making biased decisions about 
creditworthiness, county committees fail to render rational 
decisions about credit.58 In this context, as in so many 
others, the transparency of race becomes evident. 
Moreover, as a political unit, the County Committee 
is not accountable to the people it serves. While local 
farmers may withhold their power to vote for certain 
nominees, the real overseer of political responsibility in 
this case is USDA. A system of governance where 
decisions can be reviewed on the merit for bias or 
unfairness, but in fact were not, again creates a political 
unit that has an uncontrollable dynamic. The political unit 
becomes, in reality, self-perpetuating, with little regard to 
USDA policy. To the extent that the geographical 
boundaries create and give license to a political structure 
of citizen participation whose very nature impacts the 
market economy, one can ill afford to conclude that this 
political body's failure to account for the needs of all of 
its citizens is sanctioned simply because of the manner in 
which the political body was chosen. The long and sordid 
history of racial subordination in this country, especially 
in the Deep South, makes ludicrous any claim that the 
mere provision for a democratic ideal, such as an election, 
could ever rise above the narrow interests of the few who 
stood to benefit from discrimination against others. The 
system of agricultural financing through the county 
committee may have been designed primarily as an 
administrative function. The justification for the 
continuance of such a system falls far short, however, 
given USDA's failure to monitor the operations; it must 
be forced to hold accountable those elected locally to 
defend the democratic ideals and principles in action. 
B. LOCAL ECONOMIC MARKETS 
USDA plays a central and unique role in providing 
financing to small farmers for several reasons. First, the 
small farm, as with other small businesses, faces difficulty 
in securing credit in the traditional financing market.59 
Second, the atypical valuation of agricultural products 
makes USDA an expert lender.60 It has developed the 
capacity to base economic predictions on crop values and 
yields that more adequately balance the risk in the 
business of farming. Third, USDA functions as a lender 
to compensate for market shortages. As a lender of last 
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resort, it closes the financing gap for borrowers who are 
unable to obtain credit from traditional financial 
institutions.61 Given this country's general history of racial 
discrimination, with specific focus on issues of credit 
access, this third function makes USDA's procedures even 
more astonishing. 
Why then did USDA not provide credit to minority-
owned small farms? How does USDA perform its role as 
a financial intermediary, given market imperfections and 
frictions? Three costs-transaction, information, and 
agency-are the foundation of financial intermediation 
and provide an explanation of the role that USDA plays in 
lending to small farms, including those that are minority-
owned. Identifying the informational disadvantages about 
USDA-guaranteed loans highlights the limits on access of 
minority-owned farmers have to capital. 
1. Information costs 
Information costs are incurred when lenders evaluate 
a borrower's creditworthiness. The lender evaluates the 
riskiness of the borrower's project before and after the 
grant of credit. In markets that operate in perfect 
efficiency, lenders have complete information, allowing 
well-advised decisions about a borrower's ability to repay. 
In less-than-perfect markets, lenders must incur costs to 
determine whether the borrower will perform as expected 
under the lending agreement. 
To avoid incurring the information costs that 
accompany lending, theorists posit that lenders ration 
credit, making less credit available at lower rates of 
interest.62 The lower rate of interest, however, attracts 
more borrowers to the lender. The lender then must 
determine how it will determine the less risky projects that 
are entitled to a lower interest rate.63 Credit rationing is a 
way to attain equilibrium in the market. A lender raises 
and lowers the rate of interest according to the amount of 
risk that the borrowers' project presents.64 Under this 
theory, all small farms, including minority-owned farmers, 
have unlimited access to credit at an interest rate that 
appropriately reflects the riskiness of their project. Credit 
rationing theory posits that because lenders have 
asymmetrical information about a borrower's ability to 
repay an obligation, the lender uses the borrower's profit 
projections to measure two different effects: the risk 
adverse effect and the moral hazard effect. These effects 
measure two separate types of behavior in which the 
average high-risk borrower is likely to engage: adverse 
selection and moral hazard.65 
The adverse selection effect screens out potential 
borrowers before the loan is made.66 It identifies the risk-
adverse borrower by drawing a correlation between the 
borrower who is willing to pay a higher rate of interest 
with the riskiness of the project.67 This borrower presents 
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contradictory infonnation on expected profits, e.g., she is 
willing to borrow at a high interest rate because she 
expects profits to· increase with risk. The low-risk 
borrower, by contrast, will find higher interest rates 
prohibitive, and will look for credit at a lower cost. 
Lenders, who are not privy to sufficient infonnation 
regarding the borrower's business operations, may thus 
limit the amount of credit that they are willing to extend to 
risk-adverse borrowers.68 
The moral hazard effect refers to the borrower's 
behavior after the loan is made.69 This effect measures the 
incentive that the borrower has to engage in risk-free 
behavior. This borrower is willing to pay a high interest 
rate because of the potential for a high return. The 
borrower's project, which is extremely risky, has a low 
probability of success. Should the project succeed, its 
return will be great. The lender is willing to lend to this 
type of borrower at a higher rate of interest to protect 
against default. 
To the extent that there is asymmetrical infonnation 
between lenders and small farmers, credit-rationing theory 
suggests that small farms with projects calculated to yield 
positive earnings may be unable to obtain financing at any 
cost. Thus, an intennediary such as USDA becomes a 
significant lender to the small farm market. USDA has 
arguably created a structure that provides it with screening 
and monitoring advantages that reduce the risks of adverse 
selection and moral hazard. The county committee 
structure allows USDA to become an "inside" lender, as 
compared with a public market lender, who operates with 
more limited infonnation in making arms-length 
transactions.70 Arguably, this relationship benefits the 
lender, who is able to ease the infonnation asymmetry 
with some advantage accruing to the borrower who can 
benefit from financing terms that more realistically meet 
herneeds?l 
The USDA decision-making structure places a 
strong reliance on the county committee system. 
Theoretically, the task of local farmers is to abate 
infonnational deficiencies by providing infonnational 
advantages when screening credit applicants and 
monitoring borrowers. What is required is more 
circumspection into the adequacy of this structure given 
its composition of local landowners, who are engaged also 
in the business of farming. 
The question becomes whether small, minority-
owned farmers are getting all of the credit that is available 
to them, given the benefits of this "inside" infonnational 
advantage. Minority farmers would argue that within this 
efficiently operating system, credit rationing exists not in 
price increases but in reduced quantity or availability 
rationing.72 While the county committee may be a crucial 
link to the production and transfer of infonnation reducing 
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infonnation asymmetry and credit rationing, the next issue 
is whether the county committee plays a role in limiting 
transaction costs, which also tend to limit the supply of 
credit. 
2. Transaction costs 
Transaction costs are the costs of acquiring and 
verifying infonnation and arise primarily through 
interactions between individuals.73 To some extent, the 
difficulty that many small farmers have had in obtaining 
credit from private sources is due to transaction costs, 
which is why those farmers then tum to USDA for 
financing. 
Credit is available from various sources, some of 
which are able to finance it more cheaply than others. 
Financing costs include the charges that the intennediary 
incurs for the credit review and documentation process. 
The financi~ intennediary incurs financing costs when it 
identifies and contacts borrowers and investors and when 
it negotiates, verifies and enforces the contracts.74 These 
functions can be prohibitively costly and interfere with 
credit availability because they price the buyer out of the 
market.75 
The transaction costs that a lender incurs and passes 
on to the borrower through the pricing of the loan are 
most likely less than those that the borrower would incur 
if the borrower were to find investors on her own.76 There 
are several reasons why these costs are incurred. First, the 
typical borrower will have difficulty finding investors 
willing to invest in an illiquid asset, such as a small 
business?7 Second, the illiquidity of the investment also 
contributes to its lack of diversification as an investment.78 
Finally, investors cannot be protected from the credit risks 
that accompany this unique investment.79 Thus, because 
the borrowers' inability to identify investors willing to 
take on the risks of default, small farm borrowers are 
especially disadvantaged in the credit economy. 
Similarly, an intennediary's transaction costs will be less 
than those that the individual borrower may incur if she 
were to seek her own investors. Although a lender may 
have concerns about financing farm operations, banks, in 
particular, are able to attract investors who are willing to 
leave their funds on deposit with the bank for a variety of 
funding needs. 
For qualifying borrowers, USDA as a lender reduces 
search costs.80 Many farmers, including small farmers, 
seek financing from USDA because it is a readily 
identifiable source of funds. Although USDA, as a 
specialized lender, is concerned with the liquidity of its 
assets, its concerns are different because it is a 
governmental entity.81 Unlike a bank, which must be 
concerned about the liquidity of a loan because of the 
investors who fund it, USDA has no similar concern. 
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USDA has no investors. Its primary concern is in 
maintaining congressional approval and confidence that 
the fund is well administered. The U.S. Treasury protects 
the solvency of USDA's guaranteed loan funds.82 
Functionally, in its role as a financial intermediary, 
USDA's performance is enhanced through the use of the 
county committees. Its procedural structure operates to 
minimize transaction costS.83 Financial intermediaries 
routinely diversify risk, evaluate investments, and provide 
liquidity to the investors. The county committee serves 
this function through its decision-making structure. To 
the extent that the county committee makes decisions 
about the availability of credit, it arguably makes those 
decisions based on predictors about loan performance. 
An adequate assessment of transactions costs develops a 
diversified portfolio among eligible borrowers. The 
committee has discretion to make awards based on the 
potential borrower's request or to determine that a lesser 
amount is more manageable for the particular borrower. 
Similarly, its cautious considerations on loan servicing for 
troubled borrowers allows it to determine which 
borrowers are less risky among the group of those that are 
financially troubled and deserving of debt restructuring. 
Thus, the county committee develops some expertise in 
determining who is most eligible for benefits, given some 
implied conditions. It also determines who actually 
receives benefits based on its translation of the 
information about the borrower and her ability to perform 
as promised. 84 These functions overlap with the agency 
costs (or the lender's costs) in managing the loan once the 
borrower actually receives the funds. 
3. Age1lcy Costs 
Agency costs represent the cost that lenders must 
incur in determining whether the borrower performs as 
expected under the lending agreement. One way of doing 
this is to evaluate the business manager's acumen and 
character.85 The business of farming, as in many other 
small businesses, requires a borrower who will advance 
the business through hard work and great effort. 86 The 
lender's manager must be able to assess the specific 
abilities of the borrower as farmer. 
Small business borrowers who do not have equity 
will find it difficult to obtain credit from a lender. This is 
due in part to the moral hazard effect.87 The borrower who 
has insufficient assets at risk has little incentive to refrain 
from dishonest conduct or to exert maximum effort.88 The 
lender needs the ability to limit the borrower's moral 
hazard. This requires the lender to find alternatives to 
closely supervising the borrower, which is itself a cost that 
may not have a corresponding benefit.89 Debt financing 
requires the lender to determine the net returns of the 
business in order to assess the ability to repay the 
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obligation.9o A part of this evaluation involves assessing 
the business manager's reliability. By relying on the 
borrower or her manager to carry out the business plan, 
the manager becomes the agent of the financing source.91 
The desire to avoid agency costs may be implicit in 
the county committee structure. By delegating loan 
review function to local farmers, USDA is trying to 
improve its predictions about borrower performance. Its 
ability to monitor loan performance may provide some 
insight into the prominent role that USDA has assumed in 
financing small, minority-owned farms. 
USDA loans are designed for borrowers who do not 
qualify for loans in the traditional market. Eligible 
borrowers are those who often are unable to obtain 
financing because they do not have sufficient collateral for 
the loan and equity investment in the business.92 The high-
risk borrower's actions are difficult to control and it is 
therefore unrealistic to think that she will behave as an 
agent of the lender in monitoring the business' adherence 
to its proposed plan. The borrower has little reason not to 
adopt a "win big, lose big" strategy.93 
It is possible that the county committee, in its 
deliberations regarding minority farmers, is considering 
the agency costs of the loan. Appropriately, under agency 
theory, the committee may find that many farmers who 
come to USDA as a lender of last resort have little to lose 
or inadequate skill in business management, either of 
which would make them poor debt risks.94 While this is a 
function of the committee, it is implicit at best, arising out 
of the economic justifications of the county committee 
structure. 
If this is the case, the county committee is not 
applying the proper eligibility requirements to the loan 
application process. It is substituting its judgment of 
eligibility for the federal standard. The county committee 
may be using what it deems the standard should be and 
thereby creating a more onerous standard. By qualifying 
borrowers to receive USDA loans that have equity capital 
to invest,95 collateral to put Up,96 or the ability to give 
personal guarantees,97 the county committee as lender is 
safeguarding USDA funds against default but also is 
making loans to borrowers who would be eligible in the 
traditional market. 
The county committee structure is a social and 
political force that makes race seem like a natural 
phenomenon rather than a social construction.98 The 
exclusion of African-American farmers who should have 
qualified for USDA loans constructs segregated farming 
communities. As a result, race and space converge to 
impact the community in two ways. First, African-
American farmers become defined by the members of the 
county committee as those who are not successful in their 
occupation. Second, the loss of income from farming 
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identifies African-American fanners as unworthy of loans, 
which begins the vicious cycle that can lead eventually to 
the loss of farmland for these fanners. This conduct by 
the county committee breeds the continuation of the white 
dominant norm. Because the exclusion of black fanners 
feels neutral to the members of the county committee and 
other local USDA officials, the perpetuation of whiteness 
and disappearance of eligible African-American fanners 
for USDA loans may be unapparent. The economic 
consequences are positive for those white fanners who 
themselves benefit from the domination of a race-
conscious process that the white fanners can label as 
neutral and rational. In fact, the white fanners have 
racialized the neutral process to dominate economic 
access to USDA funds. 
C. THE INTERSECTION BETWEEN POLITICS AND 
ECONOMICS: LACK OF ACCESS TO CREDIT AS 
REACIALIZED ECONOMIC SPACE99 
Because the business of lending is one of wealth 
maximization, the rationales of economic efficiency, 
capitalism, and the free market are more than adequate 
justifications for credit and lending decisions. Denial of 
credit based upon race or geographic location of 
property,IOO presuming the applicant is otherwise 
creditworthy, is clearly irrational because the lender 
would forego a favorable transaction. IOI 
The county committee, acting on behalf of the 
lender, USDA, adheres to the principles of self-interest 
and wealth maximization.102 As lenders, its 
rationalizations for lending based on race or geographic 
location of the person or property are arguably justifiable 
based on poor underwriting conditions, increased 
information costs, additional opportunity costs, and 
perceptions of risks. Given the facially neutral regulations 
that govern the eligibility for USDA credit, why are 
county committees reluctant to provide credit to eligible 
African-American fanners? A fundamental assumption is 
that as lenders, the county committees are engaging in the 
practice of redlining, a term that refers to making credit 
decisions based on the borrower's geographic location or 
the geographic location of the loan. 103 
First, it is reasonable to conclude that the county 
committees as lenders have decided to avoid entire 
geographical areas, e.g., African-American owned 
farmland. The county committee's presumption that the 
borrowers are not creditworthy and that they are risk-
averse leads to the conclusion that the property has a 
declining value. Using USDA procedures, those who did 
receive loans could be required to over-collateralize them. 
Loans made to African-American fanners were considered 
potentially unprofitable because of the threat of collateral 
depreciation or failure to repay. A failed credit obligation 
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was presumed. Thus, when the county committees did 
make loans to African-American fanners, they were 
considered profitable only if ,credit was extended on 
unfavorable terms.104 
Second, county committees could argue that higher 
monitoring and administrative costs justify failure to lend 
to African-American fanners. By identifying loans that 
might be unprofitable, USDA avoids the costs of 
collecting on bad debt. lOS The information costs of 
screening and monitoring make these loans more costly 
and less profitable. The extraordinary type of evaluative 
mechanism resulting in more processing serves as an 
adequate justification for failure to lend. Yet, this is 
precisely the type of informational advantage that a 
localized lending structure should yield.106 
Third, county committee members rely on "risk 
stereotypes.,,107 Their lending decisions are based on their 
subjective perceptions regarding the loan's profitability 
given their personal knowledge of the applicant and the 
applicant's financial status. Race and farming skill 
become indicators. Undoubtedly, county committee 
members would defend these perceptions as a needed 
dimension to determining the borrower's 
creditworthiness. lOS Presumably, this is one of the 
informational advantages that close the lending gaps 
instead of widening them. Subjective perceptions may 
directly impact the borrower's ability to secure the amount 
of credit she actually wants.109 Inaccurate perceptions 
result in lower loan amounts, which in turn contribute to 
loan failure. 110 
Decentralized lending offers some inherent structural 
advantages. It appears, however, that the county 
committee system has failed to consider the need for fair 
lending. One of the advantages that localized lending 
should have alleviated is racial credit rationing and its 
justifications.111 An underlying presumption of localized 
lending is that the decision-makers will assess the 
dynamics of lending to their communities. While this 
requires recognition of risks associated with lending, it 
also should alleviate lending disparities by developing 
more information about the communities and the 
borrowers that better predict loan performance. By 
devoting more resources to screening and monitoring, 
information costs are increased, but more reliable 
indicators ofloan performance are also developed.112 
Additionally, members of the county committees, 
unlike bankers, are not acutely concerned with the impact 
of the lending decision on the bank's solvency. A bank's 
profit increases with each profitable loan made. Unlike a 
bank, USDA's ability to lend is based only in small part 
on the performance of its loan portfolio.113 FSA's 
congressional funding, while concerned with loan 
profitability and delinquencies, does not use loan 
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perfonnance or yields as a sole determinant for access to 
federal monies. Borrowers are deterred from defaulting 
on these obligations because they are barred from 
receiving additional loan funds. 114 Thus the primary factor 
that defines irrational redlining (competitive market 
pressures) is absent in the federal agricultural lending 
sphere since it operates in a unitary market, providing 
loans to borrowers who are unable to receive credit 
elsewhere. 115 The geo-Iending that results in credit denials 
to minority neighborhoods is less evident in the rural areas 
where white-owned or occupied farms may be adjacent to 
black-owned or occupied farrnland. 116 Yet, a pattern in 
lending disparities persists, perhaps due to irrational racial 
redlining. 
The failure to connect federalism and economic 
theories as having a combined impact limits the measures 
of needed refonn. While local agrarian interests have 
received federal support as an institution, USDA's actions 
elevated the role of the county committee to that of a 
political institution that has the power to affect economic 
policy and development. Political institutions that rest on 
the attitudes and preferences of citizens as infonned, 
unbiased decision-making but which are in fact operating 
with bias and self-interest are abusing majoritarian power. 
Any remedy addressing this type of abuse must recognize 
and compensate for the true nature of the economic harms. 
IV. THE PROPOSAL: AN ALTERNATIVE 
MEASURE FOR THE LOSS OF 
DISCRIMINATORY ACCESS TO CREDIT IN 
THE SMALL BUSINESS CONTEXT 
Legislation alone will not ameliorate the racial 
disparities in fann lending. Perceptions must be changed. 
Unifonn federal laws and effective enforcement can, 
however, begin the process. In this section I recommend 
two changes that have the potential to decrease farm 
lending discrimination, improve the accountability of local 
leaders involved in the decision-making structure, and 
accurately meaure the complexities of the losses. 
This section begins by explaining the deficiencies of 
existing anti-discrimination statutes as remedies and then 
recommends several modifications to the current USDA 
credit-granting policy towards small farm lending. First, it 
recommends changes in small business loan reporting 
requirements, particularly in the recording and publication 
of loan approval rates on small business loans to make 
county committees more accountable. The second 
recommendation calls for a change in USDA's eligibility 
criteria for service on county committees. This proposed 
change aims to cure the inherent conflict of interest among 
committee members that perpetuates bias and self-interest 
in lending practices. The third recommendation proposes 
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a theory of prospective loss of inheritance when small 
business owners can prove a nexus between business 
failure and lack of access to credit. 
A. THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT: AN 
INADEQUATE REMEDY 
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA,,)117 
allows an individual to challenge discrimination in 
economic or credit transactions based on intentional 
conduct and subtle acts and policies that amount to 
discrimination. 118 It applies to consumer as well as 
business lending.119 ECOA would appear to provide the 
appropriate remedial approach for black fanners, given 
that small businesses were involved. The ECOA, 
however, has a narrower standing. 
Under the act, a plaintiff may prove that a iender has 
unfairly discriminated by showing either disparate 
treatment or disparate impact. 120 Disparate treatment is 
established through explicit and unambiguous statements 
of hostility towards persons protected by ECOA. 121 Those 
statements must prove discrimination without inference or 
presumption. 122 The burden then shifts to the lender to 
prove that it would not have made the loan in the absence 
of impermissible criteria. 123 In a direct evidence case, a 
lack of qualification may be asserted as a means of 
evidence refuting causation. 124 Thus, the plaintiff must 
show that given the financial institution's lending policies, 
her proposed loan fell within those guidelines. l25 In a 
plaintiff s prima facie case, she must demonstrate that she 
was otherwise minimally qualified for a loan. The 
creditor then has the burden to raise as an issue of fact a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the credit denial. 
A disparate impact analysis makes it unnecessary for 
the plaintiff to show evidence of a discriminatory 
motive. 126 To prove a disparate impact case, a credit 
applicant must show that the lender's practices or patterns 
of behavior have a discriminatory effect and cannot be 
supported by a business necessity. Even though the policy 
or practice may appear facially neutral, the test measures 
whether the statistical effect disproportionately excludes 
or injures an applicant who is a member of a protected 
class.127 The burden then shifts to the creditor to prove 
that the practice has a manifest relationship to the credit in 
question. The creditor's explanation must be specific and 
direct. 128 After such a showing, the burden then shifts 
back to the plaintiff to show that the practice is a pretext 
for discrimination. 129 The loan applicant has the 
evidentiary burden of proving that she was qualified for 
the loan, regardless of the theory of proof asserted. 130 
The lack of minority applicants in many of the 
counties demonstrates the disparate impact of USDA's 
marketing and lending committees in the Southeastern 
United States. Reported incidents included both overt acts 
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of discrimination and experience with latent policies that 
have the effect of either not lending to African-American 
farmers or lending to them on different terms than their 
white counterparts. This unwritten policy of racial 
discrimination is without solid business justification and 
has prevented black farmers from seeking or receiving 
USDA loan funds without regard to the qualification of 
the applicants. Statistics on the number of loan applicants 
received from white farmers and the number received 
from African-American farmers show the racial impact of 
these policies. 13l Yet, even in a successful case, the 
applicability of the remedy would be greatly limited. 
B. CHANGES IN USDA's REGULATORY STRUCTURE 
1. Unijonn Applicability of Fair Lending 
Requirements 
Regulatory uniformity in lending practices can 
address USDA's systemic failure to eliminate 
discrimination and its lack of accountability in the county 
committee structure. Aggressive enforcement of the 
existing discrimination laws must be augmented by 
initiation of new enforcement mechanisms. More 
specifically, implementing criteria similar to the Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Act's (HMDA)132 data-collection 
requirements would allow small lending advocates to 
uncover and investigate lending bias.133 Only consistent 
and uniform records for review can allow fair decisions 
about who is receiving USDA loan funds. l34 
HMDA's primary purpose is to uncover redlining by 
lenders. It requires lenders to provide sufficient 
information for public inspection.135 Lenders must report 
the number and total dollar amount of mortgage loans 
originated or purchased by the institution during each 
fiscal year, along with the overall approval and rejection 
rates for each lender. 136 The statute does not require the 
lender to disclose the reasons for rejection. Therefore, it 
is difficult to uncover intentional discrimination without a 
review of the complete loan file of a rejected individual.137 
HMDA is effective because it allows fair lending 
advocates to use the data to show the disparities in the 
lending process. By exposing a lender's unwillingness to 
make objective decisions about lending based on income 
and ability to repay instead of geographical sites of the 
residential property, fair lending advocates have been able 
to become more vocal about the limited credit access in 
.. 'd'al 138 mmonty reSI enti areas. 
Incorporating HMDA-like requirements into 
USDA's regulatory structure could provide a multi-
faceted solution. First, it would require USDA as a lender 
to have adequate record-keeping and reporting 
requirements, alleviating some disparities in lending by 
using the reporting requirements to provide a basis for 
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applicant comparisons. Implementing a HMDA-like 
scheme would provide a basis for minority applicants to 
demonstrate that they are being treated differently than 
non-minority applicants on credit determinants like 
farming experience, projected crop yields, and ability to 
repay. USDA needs to develop the internal capability to 
determine whether there is consistency in the loan 
approval process based upon statistical evidence. It can 
then become more accountable to its constituent farmers 
despite its decentralized lending scheme. 
Furthermore, requiring the reporting of the reason 
for a denial of a USDA loan request can provide the basis 
for more efficient investigation into credit access. By 
requiring USDA to disclose the reasons for rejection, 
more appropriate comparisons can be made between 
minority and white applicants. Such a system would make 
possible a review of loan approvals with loan denials. 
Accordingly, USDA should be required, when requested 
by a rejected applicant, to make comparisons between the 
loans denied and those that were approved by similarly 
situated applicants. 139 The data then becomes a 
distinguishing basis for comparisons with other counties 
lending on size of the farms and income levels. These 
types of analysis will help unearth lending disparities. 
Finally, unlike HMDA, the USDA legislative 
scheme should provide a private right of action to farmers 
experiencing discrimination in lending practices. This 
would allow the data to be used in a meaningful way by 
h d· tl· d 140 those w 0 are trec y lffipacte . 
HMDA relies upon regulatory examinations and 
supervision for compliance. The possibility of individual 
enforcement actions focuses the lender on the seriousness 
and immediacy of potential violations. The proposed 
schematic creates a relationship between the lender and 
the individual applicant. Thus, the threat of financial 
exposure, should a lending violation be found, creates 
. 1 d' d " 141 incentives for more cautious en mg etenmnations. 
Moreover, a private right of action provides a fuller 
remedy because it creates direct accountability by the 
lender to the applicant. 
2. Monitoring the County Committee 
ECOA prohibits creditors from engaging in 
discrimination in any part of the lending process. 142 
Although the statute does not specifically address unfair 
marketing practices, discouraging minorities from 
applying for credit is barred under the statute. This can be 
read to include a prohibition not only on the way that 
USDA identifies and assists borrowers in filling out loan 
applications, but potentially to reach the composition and 
authority of the county committees. 
Local farm agents' differential treatment of minority 
applicants constitutes a discriminatory credit practice. 
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Under ECOA, USDA and its county committees are 
creditors and may be subject to violations of the statute 
for pre-application marketing and discrimination. 143 
Under FSA guidelines, USDA employees at the local level 
are responsible for assisting farmers with the FSA loan 
application. The failure to assist minority farmers, many 
of whom tell tales of being denied an opportunity to even 
receive an application, reflects the USDA officials' 
influence over the applicant pool: it is difficult to assess 
the denial rate of minority farmers if they are not even 
given an opportunity to apply. This type of treatment by 
USDA representatives has served as an effective deterrent 
to minority farmers from low-interest, federally 
guaranteed loan funds. 
The common discriminatory practices of the county 
committees may be effectively remedied under ECOA and 
through changes in USDA's regulatory structure. USDA 
needs a more rigorous means to identify appropriate 
borrowers and make the county committee system 
accountable for irregularities in its distribution of 
agricultural benefits and 10ans. l44 Mandatory changes can 
be as basic as requiring USDA to send notices in advance 
of yearly funding allocations to all farmers. It could also 
monitor the guidance and assistance that local USDA 
agents provide to individual farmers to ensure that it is 
provided in a non-biased way. A more significant change 
would be to establish an agricultural ombudsman that 
systematically and randomly reviews credit determinations 
for disadvantaged farmers. This type of self-enforcement 
can bring much-needed credibility to a prejudiced process. 
USDA should address conflict of interest situations 
as well. It is problematic for those making the credit 
decisions to also be the ones who are in direct competition 
with potential borrowers for loan funds. 145 It should be a 
violation of credit discrimination laws for a member of the 
county committee, or his or her family, to purchase 
property that is subject to sale based on a denial of credit 
that has occurred within two years. 146 Instead of a county 
committee made up of local farmers, USDA should 
institute a committee system composed of disinterested 
persons who are qualified for make agricultural lending 
decisions. In order to draw upon a qualified pool of 
persons able to serve, USDA should offer a training and 
certification process that provides the opportunity for 
competent local citizens to assume these decision-making 
roles. 147 
Recognizing the unique nature of agricultural 
lending, there should be an expedited review at the 
national level of minority farmers' denied loan requests. 
By creating an immediate right to appeal, minority 
applicants who may have been unfairly discriminated 
against in the past will feel that the process is more 
sensitive to their concerns. Furthermore, unnecessary 
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delays in planting and harvesting crops could potentially 
be avoided. The review can be based on previously 
collected information from prior years' determinations. If 
the information is readily accessible, the review process 
need not be unnecessarily prolonged. Finally, an 
opportunity for a review at the federal level gives farmers 
a better chance of assessing whether there is a pattern of 
lending disparity among the local decision-makers. 
C. MEASURING THE INTANGIBLE BUSINESS LOSSES: 
RECOVERY FOR PROSPECTIVE Loss OF 
INHERITANCE 
One of the complexities of the loss of a business is 
that it is an economic IOSS.148 In tort law, economic harm 
unaccompanied by physical injury is not usually 
recoverable. 149 When there is pure economic loss due to 
negligence, however, the law recognizes a remedy. 150 
Such are the rationales of statutes recogmzmg 
discrimination as compensable wrongdoing. 151 Actual 
losses in an ECOA case may be minimal. 152 
Compensating the business that suffers credit 
discrimination allows recovery for the consequential 
losses of income or profits. Compensation for credit 
discrimination when the federal government is a defendant 
is limited to actual damages. 153 The question becomes 
whether that compensation alleviates the economic 
injustice. 
For the small farm that has been put out of business 
by the federal government's complicity in a discriminatory 
lending scheme, there needs to be recognition that the 
discrimination wrongfully interfered with a business' 
development. In the case of the failure or insolvency of 
the business due to the discriminatory credit decisions, 
actual damages should include compensation for the loss 
of prospective inheritance. Such a contextual examination 
could result in a fuller remedial measure by recognizing 
the future stream of income that has been lost because of 
the discriminatory conduct. 
1. Loss of Prospective Inheritance 
ECOA creates a duty for creditors to make lending 
decisions in a non-discriminatory manner. In this regard, 
tort law defines its duties and remedies. 154 The statute 
allows compensation for actual damages and for punitive 
damages up to $10,000. I55 Although the statute is meant 
to halt discrimination for discriminatory lending to 
individuals and small businesses, its remedial scheme is 
flawed in that it fails to require a specific focus on the 
decline in the business' net worth as it affects 
beneficiaries and their loss of prospective inheritance. 156 
a. An analogy to the wrongful death recovery for loss 
of prospective inheritance 
STANFORD LAW & POLICY REVlEW 
Special damages are those that are peculiar to each 
individual case.157 A damage award is held to be 
"special" if it arises naturally, yet not necessarily, from a 
wrongful act.15S Damages for loss of inheritance are an 
example of the expanded scope of pecuniary damages 
currently available in wrongful death actions.159 Loss of 
inheritance damages are generally defined in terms of the 
pecuniary advantage the decedent would have bestowed 
upon the beneficiary.16o 
Loss of inheritance as a damage remedy captures the 
rationale in tort policy that the injured plaintiff should be 
fully compensated for her injury.161 Had the decedent 
lived a full and normal life, she would have accumulated 
property that would have passed to beneficiaries.162 Loss 
of inheritance damages generally consist of the present 
value of property and earnings which the deceased 
reasonably would have been expected to add to the estate 
and, at natural death, would have left to her statutory 
beneficiaries.163 Despite their speculative nature, the role 
of the jury in determining the propriety of a loss of 
inheritance award provides a proper balance.l64 
To prove loss of inheritance damages, the plaintiff 
must show that the decedent, but for her wrongful death, 
would have accumulated an estate and that the plaintiff 
would have been alive at the conclusion of the decedent's 
natural life to receive this inheritance.165 Furthermore, the 
plaintiff must demonstrate that she would be one of the 
natural recipients of the decedent's estate. 166 Loss of 
inheritance presumes an increase in the pecuniary value of 
an estate, which the beneficiary must prove.167 
b. Compellsatillg discrimillatory lack of access to 
credit that results ill busilless failure 
Property ownership, including ownership of a small 
business, represents authority and empowerment and thus 
entitlement.16S Access to capital is crucial to the 
continuous ownership of any small business. Capital is 
needed to both stabilize and expand the business 
production. The issues surrounding entitlement and lack 
of access to credit combine to define future interests in 
failed business property.169 
The loss of a business due to discriminatory lending 
practices is similar to the death of a party by tort. In place 
of bodily injury is economic injury. A past harm has 
occurred that warrants compensation because the 
tortfeasor owed a duty to the decedent. In this case, 
USDA is the tortfeasor because it had a duty to provide 
financing as a lender of last resort to farmers who 
qualified for USDA loans. Its actions-ceding authority 
to the county committees who made discriminatory 
decisions regarding minority farmers-proximately 
caused the injury suffered by those farmersPo Many 
minority farmers are limited resource farmers by 
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definition who would qualify for USDA loans because 
they are unattractive to lenders on the open market.171 
African-American farmers who lost their farms 
because they could not secure adequate financing owned 
an asset that was both business property and inheritable 
property. To the extent that the economic remedy for 
business loss seeks fairly and adequately to compensate 
the injured parties, there should be a recovery for the full 
economic loss and the loss to the injured parties, e.g., the 
survivors. 172 
Moreover, farmland represents a business asset that 
is often bequeathed, making its loss more than just 
economic. Thus, a theory of loss recovery must value as a 
pecuniary interest the relationship between the small farm 
as a business entity, the owners of that entity, and the 
testamentary value of the property. The relationship 
should recognize the unique nature of land as property, 
the income-producing character of which is a business. 
Analogizing further, the decedent is the small farm. 
The landowner is the beneficiary whose rights have been 
lost and should be compensated. What the landowner as 
beneficiary has lost is both the income of the farm and 
survivor rights that allow a choice about how the future 
interests of the small farm should be distributed. 
This is similar to what occurs when owners dissolve 
a business. While the owner of a business has the right to 
receive its present income while in operation, that same 
owner has the right to receive future income that the 
business creates once it is dissolved.173 Those rights are 
not extinguished because the business has ceased to 
operate; rather, they survive until there is no income 
produced by the business. While the length of this wind-
up phase may be indefinite, what is significant is that the 
attachment of the right to the owner cannot be severed as 
long as there is an income-producing nature to the 
property.174 Thus, the dissolved business owners' right to 
recoupment of the business' value, including income and 
profits, is a vested right independent of the actual legal 
existence of the business. 
Defining property loss more broadly in this context 
gives value to all of the economic benefits that property 
ownership brings. By viewing discriminatory restrictions 
to credit as a pecuniary loss, the law is recognizing that 
racial disparity, in this context, affects federal agricultural 
finance. This theory compensates the value of the 
tangible and intangible assets of property ownership. In 
assessing the market value of the subsequent loss, it 
compensates for the fundamental harm suffered by black 
landowners because of USDA's discriminatory practices: 
loss of testamentary rights.175 In conduct that i~tentionally 
harmed without justification, the lender pre-empted fair 
considerations and financially injured businesses. Thus, 
as a special damage, the loss of prospective inheritance 
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equalizes the real loss of land and the future interests that 
the land as a business income-producing entity represents. 
Discriminatory loss of credit becomes a lost business 
opportunity, re-defined for this specific context. 
2. Policy Rationales Supporting Compensating 
Prospective Inheritance Rights 
Considering inheritance rights as property might 
meet with resistance for several reasons. Among the 
concerns raised are: (a) inheritance rights are intangible 
property; (b) there is no entitlement nor expectation to an 
inheritance nor are heirs identifiable at the time of the 
loss; (c) the value of inheritance rights is too speculative 
for courts to determine the amount the parties should 
receive accurately; (d) future earnings are allowed in a 
business loss; and (e) awards based on loss of inheritance 
rights would be windfalls. None of these considerations 
should present a significant barrier to recovery in this 
instance. 
a. Inheritance rights are a tangible loss 
Some may argue that inheritance rights are 
intangible to the extent that they represent an initially 
unquantifiable loss. However, whether those losses are in 
fact immeasurable is a matter of perspective. 176 Property 
rights that ensure that the injured party is fairly and 
adequately compensated can be made tangible. The 
failure to recognize intangible rights because they appear 
to be based on conjecture does not mean that they do not 
exist but that the law has not developed a workable matrix 
for recovering them. 
Inheritance rights represent compensation that is 
adequate and fair for injuries and losses. In determining 
the economic and legal bases for compensation, it is 
important to focus on the rationale for tort recovery. To 
the extent that the law intends to ensure that injured 
parties are compensated adequately and fairly for their 
injuries and losses, its optimal result is for the injured 
party to receive compensation equivalent to the full 
amount of her loss as well as the compensation that is 
proportional to the loss. 
b. Proof of expectation in inheritance is 1lot critical 
The inability of the prospective heir to prove that she 
would receive anything is another stated objection to 
recovering for prospective inheritance loss. While there is 
no entitlement to an inheritance in our society, most 
property is inherited. 177 Recognizing a loss based on an 
established legal norm is admittedly broadening the 
definition of pecuniary loss, but the limitations on that 
remedy are established by the burden of proof that the heir 
assumes in establishing a right to a recovery under the 
theory. 
What beneficiaries must prove in a future wrongful 
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death context is again instructive. A plaintiff must prove 
that the decedent: (1) was a thrifty person; (2) would have 
accumulated an estate in excess of what they left at death; 
and (3) would have left this estate to the statutory 
beneficiaries as heirs. 178 In the business loss context, a 
beneficiary should be able to recover for loss of this 
inheritance if it can be established that: (1) the 
beneficiary has received in the past support or income 
maintenance; (2) the estate has the potential for an 
accumulated or appreciated value; and (3) inheritance is a 
pecuniary IOSS.179 Inheritance rights, although not based 
on an expectancy theory, constitute compensation that is 
adequate and fair for the injuries and losses because it 
allows beneficiaries to recover the full amount of their 
loss as well as compensation that is proportional to the 
loss. 
c. The value of inherita1lce rights can be determined 
with accuracy 
Critics of inheritance rights base their objections on 
the uncertainty of the amount the parties should receive as 
well as the potential inability of the courts to determine 
that amount accurately. Critical to recovery are the heirs' 
proof of income and the prospect of its accumulation and 
appreciation. In this context, the plaintiff must 
demonstrate that the resulting losses were attributable to 
the defendant's tortious interference. Forseeability in tort 
law is assessed at the time that breach of duty occurs. 
Again, the limitations imposed on the beneficiary by the 
burden of proof serve as a control. Speculation is removed 
by requiring that the beneficiary adequately prove the 
accumulated value of the property, along with identifiable 
and intended beneficiaries. 
d. Future earnings may deny appropriate recovery 
Measuring business losses presents an array of 
options, depending on the financial status of the business 
at the time of the injury. These are losses that extend 
beyond the current asset value, some argue, and should be 
calculated based on lost future earnings. Lost future 
earnings measure the income that the injured party will 
not be able to receive because of the injury. Confining the 
measure to lost earnings, however, is inadequate 
compensation when there are limited assets. Those same 
limited assets are financially dependent on the sustained 
financial loss, since the farm needs the loan to survive. 
Thus, an award based on future earnings alone might be 
reduced because it fails to recognize how the income 
generating potential might have affected the financial 
need. 
By measuring the present value of future increased 
earnings, courts must project the increased earnings over 
the business' existence expectancy and make an award 
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based on that projected amount. 180 This theory determines 
the actual economic value of the business and awards the 
beneficiary a fair share.181 
e. Prospective loss of inheritance is not excessive 
A basic principal of remedial law is that the injured 
party should be restored to the status quo but should not 
receive more than is necessary to do that. As a remedy, 
opponents of inheritance rights argue that it represents a 
windfall because they seem to go beyond what is actually 
loss-the present income. However, that view does not 
take into account that tort injury also projects future losses 
that are impacted by the negligent behavior. To the extent 
that the recovery for injury serves a deterrent function, the 
measure for present as well as future losses serves to make 
the injured party whole. 
Requiring the tortfeasor to pay the full cost of the 
harm done provides an economic incentive to prevent 
future harm. Compensating the prospective beneficiaries 
of the business that has failed should be an independent 
loss and injury when it can be proven that discriminatory 
access to credit resulted in the financial demise of the 
business. 182 This claim is especially needed when there is 
not an action for lost future earnings. 183 In the case of a 
failed business due to discriminatory lack of access to 
credit, there would be no basis for making a future 
earnings calculation. 
In determining the economic and legal bases for 
compensation, it is important to focus on rationale for tort 
recovery. To the extent that tort law intends to ensure that 
injured parties are compensated adequately and fairly for 
their injuries and losses, its optimal result is for the 
injured party to receive compensation equivalent to the 
full amount of the loss, as well as the compensation that is 
proportional to the loss. 
While this theory arguably expands the 
compensation rights of business owners in credit 
discrimination cases, failing to fully measure small 
business loss when racial discrimination dominates 
economic policies results in economic injustice. Economic 
discrimination through loan disbursement may affect not 
only present owners but prospective future owners as well. 
Specifically, compensating the intergenerational loss of 
land requires measuring the loss in terms of what the 
property truly represents-a testamentary and an income-
producing asset. This measure is a more accurate measure 
of economic capacity at the time of actual loss. 184 
V. CONCLUSION 
[S]omewhere there should be reparations. It's 
good to know that you're saying that we're not 
going to have foreclosures, but what are you 
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going to do about those hundreds of thousands 
of acres of land that have been lost, hundreds 
of thousands of black farmers who have been 
put out of business because of policies that 
were adverse to them?185 
There is an inherent presumption in the USDA's 
funds distribution scheme that local jurisdictions are the 
most appropriate venue for determining federal 
agricultural assistance for small farmers. This 
presumption operates to make locally elected farmers 
federal agricultural policymakers. It is questionable 
whether this chosen operative is consistent with USDA's 
objectives. Beyond question is that the scheme has 
resulted in an indefensible reliance on the local county 
political consensus to meet the department's goals. 
Politically weak constituents, such as minority owners of 
small farms, are not fairly represented in a system of local 
governance that is captured by the participation of self-
interested parties. 
An economic analysis clarifies how the existing local 
structure is used. Yet economic principles, when viewed 
in isolation, disregard the legal and relational aspects of 
agency, authority, and hierarchy. A contextual 
examination of economic theory reveals that the small 
minority-owned farm is discriminated against as an 
economic unit. The county committee system allows 
biased decision-making to flourish. 
USDA's current structure raises significant 
federalism concerns. Local control is not an adequate 
means of implementing national policy and goals because 
local farmers cannot be expected to execute national 
policies and goals without maximizing their own self-
interest. The dire need for uniform and fair eligibility for, 
decision-making about, and accessibility to USDA funds 
can be remedied by more direct federal involvement in the 
distribution of agricultural financing. USDA must 
implement more stringent monitoring of credit availability 
and denials. 
Critical to any review of USDA's credit structure is 
recognition of the economic disadvantages for the small, 
minority farmer. The remedial goal should fairly 
compensate those identifiable losses that are connected to 
the harm. In this regard, intergenerationalloss recognizes 
that the damage extends beyond the immediate harm in 
discriminatory lending practice and is the needed counter-
balance to a failed participatory governance scheme. 
USDA is uniquely situated as a financial intermediary. It 
must be held accountable. 
NOTES 
I dedicate this article to the memory, life, and work of my 
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father, Robert Fulton Jones, who jokingly referred to himself as 
a "book farmer" having eamed a B.S. in agri-economics from 
Tuskegee University and a M.S. from North Carolina State 
University. My father's professional career at the United States 
Department of Agriculture spanned over 30 years. His first job 
assignment with USDA's Cooperative Extension Service was as 
a "Negro County Agent" in Wetumpka, Alabama in 1954. For 
many black farmers and their families living in central and 
southern Alabama, he was their "street lawyer," a compassionate 
friend, and their only contact with a fair and just USDA. 
Leroy Clark, Frederick C. Havard, Audrey McFarlane, and 
Ralph Rohner were especially generous in conversations and in 
reading drafts during the course of this project. This article was 
presented as a work-in-progress at the Pennsylvania and 
Delaware Valley Women Law Teacher's Annual CLE 
Conference and at the University of Cincinnati Law School 
Corporate Law Center, for which I thank Peter Letsou, Dorothy 
Brown, and their faculty colleagues. Elizabeth Justice provided 
fine research assistance. 
Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82, 87 (D.D.C. 1999). 
Since 1935, the Secretary of Agriculture has enjoyed wide 
discretion to appoint county committees to implement 
agricultural credit programs under the Soil Conservation and 
Domestic Allotment Act (Parity Act) (Soil Erosion Act). 16 
U.S.C.A. § 590h (2000). 
4 Most minority-owned farms are classified under USDA 
programs as limited resource farms. Congress created the 
Limited Resource Program (LRP) in 1978, allowing the Farm 
Service Agency (FSA) to make real estate and operating loans at 
low, subsidized rates to small and family size farmers. See 
generally, Agricultural Credit Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-334, 
92 Stat. 420, 7 U.S.C. § 1934 (2000). A limited resource farmer 
is defined as: 
[A] producer or operator of a farm: (a) with an annual 
gross income of $20,000 or less derived from all 
sources, including income from a spouse or other 
members of the household, for each of the two prior 
years; or (b) With less than 25 acres aggregated for all 
crops, where a majority of the producer's gross income 
is derived from such farm or farms, but the producer's 
gross income from farming operations does not exceed 
$20,000. 
7 C.F.R. § 457.8. 
Small farm is defined as: 
[A]ny farm (1) producing family net income from all 
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sources (farm and nonfarm) below the median 
nonmetropolitan income of the State; (2) operated by a 
family dependent on farming for a significant though not 
necessarily a majority of its income; and (3) on which 
family members provide most of the labor and 
management. 
7 U.S.C.A. § 2666(c). 
See also u.s. DEP'T OF AGRIC., A TIME TO ACT: A REpORT OF 
THE COMMISSION OF THE USDA NATIONAL COMMISSION ON 
SMALL FARMS, 27 (Miscellaneous Publication 1545, 1998) 
available at http://www.reeusda.gov/agsys/smallfarmlncosf.htm 
[hereinafter A TIME To ACT] (describing small farms as those 
"with less than $250,000 gross receipts annually on which day-
to-day labor and management are provided by the farmer and/or 
the farm family that owns the production or owns, or leases, the 
productive assets"). 
As used in this article, the word "farmers" refers to farmers 
and ranchers as defined under USDA statutes and regulations. I 
use interchangeably the terms African-American and black. 
The growing decline of small farms represents a significant 
detriment in agricultural production. First, small farms are 
beneficial because of their diversity in production. Larger farms 
have mono-cropping operations, while smaller farms are able to 
offer crops in rotation and livestock production that results in 
both biological diversity and ecological resilience. See A TIME 
To ACT, supra note 4, at 35. Secondly, the discriminatory credit 
denial negates USDA's mandate to assume a significant role as 
lender of last resorts. USDA's credit granting function is critical 
because of its expertise in farming. Farming is described as a 
"narrow-margin and high-risk business." [d. at 34. For this 
reason, many traditional financial intermediaries are not readily 
available as lenders for farmers. [d. 
African-American farmers account for about 3% of 
American farmers, owning less than four million acres of land as 
of 1991. There are reported annual losses of an average of fifty 
thousand acres resulting in a projected net loss of $2.5 million. 
This compares to ownership in 1920, when African- Americans 
owned fifteen million acres of land and 17.4% of farm operators 
were black. Lack of capital and access to financing and 
additional technological changes are cited as primary reasons for 
the decline. See Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82, 83-84 
(D.D.C. 1999). 
Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act (Parity Act) 
(Soil Erosion Act) Act, April 27, 1935, c. 85, 49 Stat. 163, as 
amended, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 16 USCA § 590h. 
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9 Money is specifically available for rural fanning operations. 
Rural areas are defined in the statute as any place with a 
population ofless than 50,000. 7 U.S.c. § 1932(d) (2000). See 
generally David Westfall, Agricultural Allotments as Property, 
79 HARV. L. REv. 1180 (1966) (questioning as sound policy the 
continuous use of agricultural subsidies by farmers and arguing 
that they create an entitlement); and Christopher R. Kelley, 
Rethinking the Equities of Federal Farm Programs, 14 N. ILL. 
L. REv. 659 (1994). 
10 FSA is a federally created lending institution within USDA, 
which makes and guarantees loans to farmers and businesses in 
rural areas. It is often referred to as USDA throughout this 
section. 
11 Direct and guaranteed farm ownership and operating loans 
are granted to farmers who are temporarily unable to meet all 
their expenses and unable to obtain private or commercial credit, 
who lack sufficient financial resources, who have limited 
resources, or who have suffered financial setbacks from natural 
disasters. Direct loans are the more limited with a maximum 
loan size of $200,000 and are made and serviced by FSA 
officials who provide supervision and credit counseling. These 
direct loans are typically farm ownership, operating, and 
emergency loans but may also include youth project loans for 
agricultural students interested in pursuing a career in fanning. 
A portion of direct loan funds is set-aside for minority 
applicants and beginning farmers. Guaranteed loans, however 
are made by conventional agricultural lenders for up to 95% of 
the principal and then guaranteed by FSA. The maximum loan 
size is $700,000 and is used for farm ownership and operating. 
As with the direct loan funds, a portion of the guaranteed loan 
funds is targeted at minority applicants and beginning farmers. 
See FSA Online, Farm Loan Programs (http://www. 
fsa.usda.gov). 
12 Borrowers may use the loans to acquire, enlarge, or improve 
farms and recreational facilities, to supplement farm income, to 
refinance existing indebtedness, or for loan closings. 7 U.S.C. § 
1942. Amendments in 1996 eliminated the availability of both 
operating and ownership loans for small nonfanning business 
enterprises in rural areas and for other purposes. Pub. L. No. 
104-127, §§ 602, 612(a), 110 Stat. 888, 1085, 1087, amending 
§§ 1923, 1942. Loans for small businesses are available from 
the SBA. See also 7 c.F.R. § 1941. 
13 USDA must target 25 percent of its farm operating and 
ownership loan awards or guarantees to beginning farmers and 
ranchers. 7 U.S.c. § 1994(b)(2) (1992). Government-backed 
debt interests are sold to generate funds to make insured loans to 
farmers. Insured loans are made to eligible borrowers, who are 
unable to obtain credit from commercial financial institutions 
and agree to ongoing supervision of their fanning operations. 
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Insured borrowers may eventfully become eligible for 
guaranteed loan funds through the USDA's indirect lending 
program. Under this program, USDA guarantees loans made to 
farmers by commercial lenders. The guarantee is for up to 90% 
of the lender's exposure. 7 U.S.c. § 1929(h); 7 C.F.R. pt. 1980 
(1998). 
14 See Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 
1990, S. Rep. No. 101-357 (1990). 
15 7 U.S.c. § 1934(a). The limited resource rate is half the 
interest rate on U.S. Treasury obligations with 5-year maturities, 
but with a statutory minimum of 5%. Limited resource rates, 
annual rates, and borrowers are reviewed annually for eligibility. 
7 U.S.c. § 1927(a)(3)(B) (for low-income farm ownership loans 
under § 1934) and § 1946(a)(2) (for operating loans). If they 
are ineligible, borrower's loan rates are increased to the regular 
interest rate. Dodson & Koenig, The Farm Service Agency's 
Limited Resource Interest Rate Program in the 1990s, in ERS, 
USDA, AGRICULTURAL INCOME AND FiNANCE SITUATION AND 
OUTLOOK REpORT (AIS-64, Feb. 1997) at 38, 39 [hereinafter 
ERS, AGRICULTURAL]. Because the FSA is a lender of last 
resort, the limited resource loan rates have been used by large 
numbers of borrowers. Between 1991 and 1995, 41% of 
operating loans and 65% of farm ownership loans carried 
limited resource rates, but more recently fewer dollars were 
loaned at those rates. During some time periods, limited 
resource borrowers have tended to carry greater debt loads and 
have lower net worth than regular rate borrowers, but in recent 
years there has been little significant difference between limited 
resource and regular borrowers. Id. at 39-41. In recent years, 
limited resource loan rates have been at the 5% statutory 
minimum for both farm ownership and operating loans, and 
since 1990 these loans have been targeted for beginning farmers. 
!d. at 38. For comparison, on January 1, 1996, limited resource 
rates were 5%; regular operating loans, 6.5%; regular farm 
ownership loans, 7%. Id. at 46. 
16 Congress re-authorized the committee's functions as 
recently as 1982, stating: 
"Congress finds that agricultural stabilization and 
conservation county and community committees have 
served, and should continue to serve, a vital function in 
implementing, at the local level, farm commodity, soil 
conservation, and related programs; and that, by 
assisting the United States Department of Agriculture to 
conduct such programs effectively, such committees 
provide substantial benefits to agriculture and the 
Nation. Congress further finds that the agricultural 
stabilization and conservation county and community 
committee system has developed, over the years, into a 
highly efficient mechanism for implementing such 
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programs at the local level. Therefore, it is the sense of 
Congress that the Secretary of Agriculture should ensure 
that the structure and operations of the agricultural 
stabilization and conservation county and community 
committees, as heretofore developed to enable such 
committees to meet the responsibilities assigned them 
under section 8(b) of the Soil Conservation and 
Domestic Allotment Act [subsection (b) of this section], 
and related statutes and regulations, be preserved and 
strengthened." Pub. L. No. 97-218, tit. IV, § 401, 96 
Stat. 216 (1982) (emphasis added). 
17 See Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82, 86 (D.D.C. 1999). 
One of the recommendations of the USDA's Civil Rights Action 
Team (CRAT) Report was to make these federal government 
positions, but to date that recommendation has not been adopted 
by USDA. 
18 FSA has a statutory obligation to provide its borrowers with 
detailed notices and appeals related to any "adverse action" of 
the agency. 7 C.F.R. § 1962.47 (1993). Congress conducted 
hearings investigating the independence of the FSA appeals 
branch. Although the National Appeals Staff is designed to be 
an independent body, the Administrator of the FSA appoints the 
Director of the National Appeals Staff. 7 U.S.c. § 1983b 
(2000); 7 C.F.R. § 1900.51-.100 (1993). The congressional 
concern led to a provision contained in the 1990 Farm Bill, 
which was intended to reinforce that independence. Pub. L. No. 
101- 624, § 1812, 104 Stat. 3821 (1990). 
19 For example, when a farmer applies USDA funds or its 
benefits program, the County Executive Director is to assist him 
or her in completing the application; the County Executive 
Director also performed an initial review of the application. 
20 See Pigford, 185 F.R.D. at 86. 
21 Id. at 90. 
22 "No acceleration of loan repayment or foreclosure will take 
place on a claimant who has a claim pending." Pigford v. 
Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82, 91 (D.D.C. 1999) (citing Consent 
Decree at <Jl 7). 
23 The court denied a previous attempt at certification of a 
class on the basis of lack of commonality. Williams v. 
Glickman, Civil Action No. 95-1149, Memorandum Opinion of 
February 14, 1997, at 7, WL 74547. The proposed class was all 
African-American or Hispanic-American individuals who had 
suffered from racial or national origin discrimination in the 
application or servicing of FSA loans, which caused them to 
sustain economic loss and/or mental anguish and/or distress 
damage. Id. This class was denied certification as being overly 
350 
broad and too amorphous with claims that were not typical or 
representative of potential class members. 
Glickman, 182 F.R.D. 341, 344 (D.D.C. 1998). 
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